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ESSAY
Reverse Advisory Opinions
Neal Devins† & Saikrishna B. Prakash††
Federal courts have increasingly issued demands and requests for legal advice from the executive branch and other parties. Without offering any justification,
federal judges simply assume that they may seek legal advice from virtually anyone. These practices warrant further scrutiny. First, we believe that the federal
courts lack the power to compel judicial advice, from parties to a case or otherwise.
To begin with, the federal courts cannot demand opinions of Congress or the president, for Article III never grants any such power. Indeed, such a power would be
inconsistent with the independence and equality that each branch enjoys. Nor can
courts compel parties to supply legal arguments because such a power is inconsistent with the autonomy that parties enjoy in litigation. Courts can no more demand that parties address particular legal questions than they can demand that
parties file suits. Second, with respect to nonparties, the federal courts generally
lack authority even to request legal opinions. The Supreme Court’s practice of calling for the views of the solicitor general is as unjustified as it is long-lived. The
lack of justification is crucial, for current practice suggests no limits. Courts might
request the advice of law professors or the National Rifle Association; they might
even poll former solicitors general of the United States about what the law is. We
believe this power to request legal advice is alien to Article III’s adversarial system
and is instead a feature of civil law systems and congressional committees, where
the inquisitors have much more latitude. The only time the federal courts may request legal advice from nonparties is when a party refuses to address a legal question deemed relevant by the court and the court asks a nonparty to provide an adversarial argument.

INTRODUCTION
A federal court recently handed out a “homework assignment”
to the Attorney General of the United States.1 The assignment
† Goodrich Professor of Law, Cabell Research Professor of Law, Professor of Government, William & Mary Law School.
†† David Lurton Massee Jr Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
We would like to thank William & Mary reference librarian Fred Dingledy, the refdesk at the University of Virginia Law Library, and our research assistant Seth Meyer
for their help. Thanks also to Amanda Frost, Brianne Gorod, Greg Reilly, and especially
Tara Grove for useful conversations about this project. Professor Prakash also thanks
the University of Virginia summer research support program.
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raises fundamental questions about the powers of the federal
courts, their relationship with the political branches, and their
power to demand or request legal advice. In April 2012, the Fifth
Circuit “directed” the Department of Justice (DOJ) to explain
whether the Obama administration endorsed judicial review.2
The order followed in the wake of President Barack Obama’s
claim that it would be an “unprecedented, extraordinary” step
for “unelected” judges to invalidate the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act.3 The court ordered Attorney General Eric
Holder to draft a letter spelling out the Department’s stance toward judicial review. The letter had to discuss the President’s
remarks, essentially ordering the Attorney General to repudiate
or endorse them.4 Finally, the Fifth Circuit decreed that the letter was to be “no less than three pages, single spaced,” and filed
within forty-eight hours.5
The Fifth Circuit’s order might seem extraordinary, but it is
part of an emerging pattern. Almost a year earlier, in July 2011,
the Ninth Circuit ordered the parties before it, including the
DOJ, to each file a brief addressing whether the implementation
of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 20106 meant that the
pending case challenging the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell7 statute was
1
See Matt Negrin, Eric Holder Completes ‘Obamacare’ Homework Assignment;
Criticism of Obama Supreme Court Comments Persists, The Note (ABC News Apr 5,
2012), online at http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/04/eric-holder-completes
-obamacare-homework-assignment-criticism-of-obama-supreme-court-comments-persists
(visited May 13, 2013). See also Matt Negrin, Holder to Respond to Judge on Obama’s
Health Law Remarks, The Note (ABC News Apr 4, 2012), online at http://abcnews.go
.com/blogs/politics/2012/04/holder-to-respond-to-judge-on-obamas-health-law-remarks
(visited May 13, 2013).
2
Order, Physician Hospitals of America v Sebelius, No 11-40631, *1 (5th Cir filed
Apr 3, 2012), online at http://amicuscuriousdotcom.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/oral
-argument-letter.pdf (visited on May 13, 2013) (“Sebelius Order”); Attorney General Eric
H. Holder Jr, Letter to Judge Jerry E. Smith, Judge Emilio M. Garza, and Judge Leslie
H. Southwick, Physician Hospitals of America v. Sebelius, No. 11-40631 1 (5th Cir filed
Apr 5, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 1130205).
3
Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010); White House Office of the Press Secretary, Press Release, Joint Press Conference by President Obama, President Calderon of
Mexico, and Prime Minister Harper of Canada (Apr 2, 2012), online at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/02/joint-press-conference-president
-obama-president-calderon-mexico-and-pri (visited May 13, 2013).
4
Oral Argument, Physician Hospitals of America v Sebelius, No 11-40631,
00:18:00 (5th Cir Apr 3, 2012), online at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/
OralArgumentRecordings.aspx (visited May 13, 2013).
5
Id; Sebelius Order at *1 (cited in note 2).
6
Pub L No 111-321, 124 Stat 3515 (2010), codified at 10 USC § 654.
7
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 § 571 (“Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell”), Pub L No 103-160, 107 Stat 1547, 1670–73 (1993), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell Repeal Act of 2010, 124 Stat 3515.
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or would be moot.8 This order was less overbearing than the
Fifth Circuit’s order: briefs had to be filed in 10 days and could
be up to 10 pages or 2,800 words.9
Without question, the practice of federal courts, including
the US Supreme Court, either ordering or requesting the DOJ to
provide legal advice is on the rise. The Supreme Court increasingly calls for the views of the solicitor general on whether the
Court should grant certiorari in cases in which the government
is not a party.10 On other occasions, the Court solicits a merits
brief from the solicitor general.11
The extent to which courts can demand or request the legal
opinions of the executive and others is an uncharted area, one
ripe for scholarly consideration. In this Essay, we begin that
long-overdue exploration.
We do not believe that the federal courts can demand legal
opinions of anyone, parties to a case included. To begin with, we
do not believe that federal courts can demand the legal opinions
of the other branches, treating them as glorified law clerks.
Courts have no more power to command the other branches to
supply legal advice than the other branches have to demand the
same of the courts. This conclusion arises from the absence of
authority under Article III to order such opinions and from the
damage it would do to the Constitution’s system of independent
and coequal branches. Furthermore, we reject the notion that
courts can force parties to a case to advance legal arguments or
supply legal advice. Binding demands for legal advice would be
inconsistent with the litigation autonomy that parties enjoy and
that Article III presumes. Any such power would suggest a judicial power not only to compel parties to reveal their weakest
points but also to advance the best legal arguments for the other
party. Article III does not permit the courts to demand of parties
whatever legal arguments or advice the courts would find useful.
Moreover, while federal courts certainly may ask the parties
to a case to address particular legal arguments, we do not believe
that those courts can ask nonparties for their view on federal law,
8
See Order, Log Cabin Republicans v United States, No 10-56634, *3 (9th Cir filed
July 11, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 2683238) (“Log Cabin Order”). See also
Log Cabin Republicans v United States, 658 F3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir 2011).
9
See Log Cabin Order at *3.
10 See Part II.A.
11 See, for example, Harris v Quinn, 133 S Ct 72 (2012) (“The Solicitor General is
invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.”); Retractable
Technologies, Inc v Becton, Dickinson and Co, 133 S Ct 72 (2012) (same).
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be they in the executive branch, members of Congress, or legal
experts.12 Basic differences between courts and legislatures, and
between inquisitorial civil law systems and the federal courts,
underlie this limit.13 Unlike congressional committees, federal
courts cannot hold hearings in which legal experts submit testimony and answer questions deemed relevant by judges and justices. Unlike the civil law inquisitorial system, Article III does
not look to judges to call witnesses, assemble evidence, and otherwise define the pertinent facts and legal issues.14 In our view,
when the parties to the case are perfectly willing to advance all
legal claims that a federal court deems relevant but the court
nonetheless solicits legal arguments from nonparties, the court
operates outside the boundaries of Article III. Because our argument suggests that the Supreme Court’s routine practice of
seeking the legal advice of the solicitor general when the government is not a party is ultra vires, some may regard it as radical and hence mistaken. We demur. In our view, current practice
is truly radical because it suggests there are no limits to the
power of federal courts to seek legal advice from nonparties. If
the Supreme Court regularly may request the views of the solicitor general, it may equally call for the wisdom of Professor Laurence Tribe, the Chamber of Commerce, or former solicitors general. In seeking to better declare what the law is, the Supreme
Court has seized a power that Article III never confers.
The questions raised in this Essay are distinct from a range
of issues dividing academics and jurists over whether federal
courts should adhere to a party-controlled dispute resolution
model or, instead, a law declaration model.15 Under the party12 Our Essay is limited to the question of federal courts seeking legal advice on issues pertaining to federal law, and, consequently, we do not consider the question of federal courts certifying questions of state law to state courts. For an insightful treatment
of this practice, see generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal
Courts to Certify Questions of State Law, 88 Cornell L Rev 1672 (2003) (examining whether
a federal court can either temporarily relinquish or abstain jurisdiction in a case).
13 See Thomas D. Rowe Jr, Authorized Managerialism under the Federal Rules—
And the Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 Sw U L Rev 191, 203–06
(2007); James G. Apple and Robert P. Deyling, A Primer on the Civil-Law System 37
(Federal Judicial Center 1995).
14 See text accompanying notes 102–15. See also Rowe, 36 Sw U L Rev at 203–06
(cited in note 13) (highlighting some similarities as well as differences between adversarial and inquisitorial models).
15 See, for example, Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L J 447, 499–
508 (2009) (defending actions by judges that raise legal claims and arguments as consistent with law pronouncements and adversary theory); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 Duke L J 1, 53–68 (2011)

2013]

Reverse Advisory Opinions

863

controlled model, courts would decide cases based on party filings and nothing else; there would be no place for courts seeking
the views of nonparties. Under the law declaration model, however, the adversarial process yields in several respects. Courts
may ask for argument on issues the parties do not raise, look to
amicus briefs, use the internet to research issues, and appoint
amici to litigate so-called orphaned issues that parties refuse to
press.16
Over the past decade, the law declaration model has made
substantial inroads and arguably now dominates Supreme Court
decision making.17 We think this development helps explain the
growing tendency of federal courts to either order or solicit the
views of DOJ lawyers. Federal courts increasingly see themselves less as umpires resolving party disputes and more as active players in sorting out what legal rules and questions are
relevant.18
Nonetheless, the practice of either ordering or soliciting legal opinions from nonparties is alien to Article III. More to the
point, neither adjudicatory model suggests or supports a judicial
power to demand or request legal advice. In our view, when both
parties are willing and able to argue those legal issues deemed
relevant by a court, that court cannot seek the assistance of a
law professor, a blue-ribbon panel composed of members of the
Supreme Court Bar, or the solicitor general. Solicitation of legal
arguments is defensible only as a means of ensuring an adversarial presentation of legal issues, meaning that such requests
are permissible only when the parties will not advance pertinent
legal arguments.19
(arguing that courts’ nominal commitment to the adversarial model obscures their reliance on extra-record facts and discussing the negative effects of assuming that all relevant information is presented through the adversarial method); Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 Mich L Rev 1191, 1227–34 (2011) (supporting party control of litigation
including with respect to agreement on legal issues); Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 Colum L Rev 665, 679–85
(2012) (exploring recent Supreme Court developments and linking them to increasing
adoption of the law declaration model’s premises).
16 See Frost, 59 Duke L J at 461–69 (cited in note 15); Gorod, 61 Duke L J at 26–35
(cited in note 15). See also Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding,
98 Va L Rev 1255, 1286–90 (2012); Brian P. Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme Court
Stop Inviting Amici Curiae to Defend Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63 Stan L Rev
907, 912–24 (2011) (surveying the history and characteristics of orphaned arguments
and appointed amici at the US Supreme Court).
17 See Monaghan, 112 Colum L Rev at 668–69 (cited in note 15).
18 Consider Frost, 59 Duke L J at 469 (cited in note 15).
19 See Goldman, Note, 63 Stan L Rev at 939–41 (cited in note 16).
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Some clarifications are in order. Ours is not a claim that the
executive or Congress is constitutionally incapable of opining on
legal matters, in a brief or otherwise. To the contrary, we think
that the political branches may share their constitutional views
with others. Furthermore, we admit that the courts and Congress can compel the executive to provide facts, documents, and
evidence.20 Hence we do not discuss subpoenas,21 compliance
with the Brady rule (requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence),22 or situations where the government has unique
access to facts that a court believes are necessary to decide a
case. Moreover, our inquiry focuses on the constitutional powers
of the three branches. We do not address whether Congress may
delegate to the president or the courts the power to either demand or request opinions from the other branches or private
parties. In addition, our argument centers on the power of federal institutions. We do not discuss whether state institutions
may compel legal advice of federal entities.23 Finally, we do not
consider the merits of the law declaration model or the partycontrolled model.24
Part I argues that federal courts cannot demand or compel
legal advice from anyone—the political branches, the parties to
a case, or nonparties. Part II contends that federal courts may
not request opinions from nonparties when the actual parties
are ready, willing, and able to address all legal questions posed
by the courts.
I. JUDICIAL DEMANDS FOR LEGAL ADVICE
In the course of deciding cases and controversies judges
have the power to “say what the law is” in their judicial opinions.25 This power is vital, for it not only helps resolve a particular case, it also generates case law that affects the course and
resolution of subsequent disputes. Given its significance, the
power to pronounce the law’s meaning should be exercised with
care and an open mind. In deciding what the law is (and is not),

20 See 2 USC §§ 192–94; FRCP 37; FRCP 45. For a discussion of the constitutionality of this practice by the legislature, see McGrain v Daugherty, 273 US 135, 175 (1927).
21 See United States v Nixon, 418 US 683, 713 (1974).
22 See Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 86–88 (1963).
23 Though we do not believe that the states enjoy such power, we do not address that
question in our Essay as it would involve a detour into the federal-state relationship.
24 See Monaghan, 112 Colum L Rev at 711–22 (cited in note 15).
25 See Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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a judge consults her own accumulated legal wisdom, the briefs,
the oral arguments, and even Google search results.26
Judges may conclude that in deciding what the law is, hearing from experts in Congress and the executive branch is imperative, even decisive. On any account of legal meaning, it is easy
to see why such consultation could be useful. Should a court believe that intentions and purposes are relevant, members of
Congress may have peculiar knowledge and expertise about congressional intent. Where practice and policy matter to a court,
executive officers have insights on both. Finally, members of
Congress and executive officers may articulate arguments that
speak to textualists on the bench who care neither about intent
nor policy.
If a judge sincerely believes that the solicitor general and
the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee have
much needed legal expertise—say, about whether a so-called
penalty is really a tax for purposes of the Constitution27—may
that judge demand or compel legal advice from these quarters?
As discussed in Part I.A, despite the utility of politicalbranch legal advice, the courts have neither power nor right to
demand it. Such demands are ultra vires. Moreover, the courts
have no right to such opinions because the Constitution never
subordinates the executive or Congress to the judiciary by requiring either to opine whenever a court would find an opinion
useful in deciding what the law is.28
Wholly apart from the separation of powers, demands for legal opinions also are inconsistent with the autonomy parties enjoy in litigation. As discussed in Part I.B, the parties decide
which claims to bring and which arguments to press. Should a
plaintiff bring a tort claim alone or append a contract claim?
Should a defendant raise an unclean-hands defense or merely
argue that the plaintiff has not satisfied the elements of the
cause of action? The parties may decide these questions for
26 See Larsen, 98 Va L Rev at 1257–60 (cited in note 16). See also Robert Barnes,
Should Supreme Court Justices Google?, Wash Post (July 8, 2012), online at
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-07-08/politics/35489765_1_scalia-justices
-federal-immigration-law (visited May 13, 2013).
27 See National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct 2566,
2594–2600 (2012).
28 When we say that the courts cannot compel legal advice from Congress or the
executive, we mean no more than that the courts cannot compel, upon pain of contempt,
the other branches to generate and yield up legal advice. While courts have held executive officials in contempt, we do not know of any instance in which they have held Congress in contempt.
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themselves taking into account their resources and interests.
The alternative, one where courts decide which claims and arguments a party to a suit must make, envisions far too much
power in the courts. For instance, a power to compel arguments
would imply a power to force parties to reveal their weakest
points. Courts could even require parties to make arguments
advancing their opponent’s cause as a means of edifying the
court in its search for the law. As powerful as federal courts are,
they cannot compel parties to make particular claims and arguments, against interest or otherwise.29
We conclude with brief comments explaining why, even if a
court can decide matters against parties that fail to address arguments that the court believes are relevant, such a power is not
part of a general authority to demand legal argumentation. Rather if such retaliation is permissible, it is so only because the
federal courts otherwise have power to decide cases without regard to their legal merits. In other words, though there may be an
ability to retaliate against parties that do not supply requested
legal advice, that ability does not imply that parties are legally
obliged to yield up advice whenever a court makes a demand.
A.

Demands for Legal Opinions from the Branches

The Constitution never authorizes the federal courts to
compel the political branches to say what the law is. The text
never grants such power. The power is inconsistent with the
separation of powers because it runs afoul of the independence
and dignity that each branch enjoys. And there is no general
practice of courts acting as if they could force the branches to
opine for their benefit.
As a matter of text, when the Constitution grants a power to
demand information, of whatever sort, it is generally explicit.30
29 Again, when we say that the courts cannot compel legal advice from the parties
to a case, we mean no more than that the courts cannot hold parties in civil contempt for
the failure to supply such advice.
To be clear, courts may identify legal issues pertinent to the resolution of a dispute.
For example, the Supreme Court sometimes calls upon parties to brief issues not raised
by the parties, including whether the Court should overturn a precedent relevant to the
resolution of the dispute. See Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 130 S Ct
876, 893 (2010). If the parties refuse to brief these issues, the Court sometimes appoints
an amicus to make arguments that the parties to a dispute are unwilling to make. For
additional discussion, see text accompanying notes 120–24.
30 The power of Congress to subpoena information from private parties and public
officials would seem to be an exception to our claim. But we think that such a power is a
background feature of what it means to be a legislature, such that it is subsumed in
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It usually does not leave such matters to shadowy implications of
the basic power grants. Because no branch has an express, generic power to command the legal opinions of its counterparts, none
of them may command the other two to provide legal opinions.
Consider Article II and its grants of authority. The president may demand the opinions in writing of the executive departments.31 He may demand the advice of the Senate on treaties and appointments, or so Article II strongly implies.32 One
implication of the Opinions Clause is that the president cannot
demand the opinions of judges, as the Justices concluded in
1793.33 An implication of the Appointments and Treaty Clauses
is that while the Senate is a council to the president with respect to treaties and appointments,34 it is not a council with respect to all matters. Hence the president has no right to the
Senate’s opinions on pardons or faithful law execution. A sound
inference from both provisions is that the president lacks generic power to demand the written opinions of, or oral advice from,
the House, Senate, and federal courts.
Drawing inferences about the powers of the other two
branches from a consideration of the president’s powers in Article II is admittedly more difficult. But perhaps it is reasonable
to suppose that the creation of express executive duties has negative implications for whether other such duties also exist. If the
president must share information or advice in particular areas,
that suggests that he lacks a wide-ranging obligation to share
information and advice.
many legislative powers granted to Congress. The same might be said of the judiciary’s
power to subpoena information—it too might be a background feature of courts. The
power to demand legal advice, from whatever quarter, was not understood to be a background feature of the judicial power, or so we argue below. For additional discussion, see
notes 20–22 and accompanying text (discussing judicial power to subpoena information).
31 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 1 (“[The President] may require the Opinion, in writing,
of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating
to the Duties of their respective Offices.”). Alexander Hamilton argued that the Clause
was redundant because the power was implicit in the hierarchical relationship between
the president and department heads. See generally Federalist 74 (Hamilton), in The
Federalist 500 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed). We cite the Clause not for its effect
on secretaries but for its implications vis-à-vis other branches.
32 See US Const Art II, § 2, cl 2.
33 See John Jay and Associate Justices, Letter to President Washington (Aug 8,
1793), in Henry P. Johnston, ed, 3 The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay
488, 488–89 (Knickerbocker 1891) (“Jay-Washington Correspondence”). For further discussion, see text accompanying note 40.
34 See George Washington, Letter to Senate Committee on Treaties and Nominations (Aug 10, 1789), in Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds, 4 The Founders’ Constitution 62, 62–63 (Chicago 1987).
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Consider the Presentment Clause.35 When the president objects to a presented bill, he must return it with “objections” to
the originating chamber. If those objections are constitutional,
he should explain why the bill would be unconstitutional if enacted into law. If those objections sound in policy, he should explain why the proposed policy changes are objectionable. In the
course of stating his policy objections, his readings of current
law and the bill will constitute (unwanted) legal advice to Congress. The presence of this narrow duty to opine on what the
Constitution, federal law, or a bill means suggests that there is
no generic constitutional duty on the part of the president to
supply legal advice to Congress.
Or consider the State of the Union Clause.36 The president
must share with Congress information about the Union. Although
people today speak of this duty as if it is satisfied by an annual
speech, the State of the Union, in fact the president complies
whenever he conveys facts and impressions to Congress.37 It may
well be that the president must provide legal advice of a sort
when he provides information on the State of the Union. For instance, if he believes that a statute is triggering unrest in certain portions of the Union, he may have to explain why the statute could be so read. But this legal advice would be narrowly
related to the goal of addressing the State of the Union. By
obliging the president to provide some information related to the
Union but not requiring him to opine on all legal matters, we
think the Clause implicitly suggests that Congress has no generic right to the executive’s legal advice.
Our point is that when one juxtaposes the presence of specific duties related to opinions and information next to the conspicuous absence of an explicit generic Article II duty to supply
legal opinions and the lack of any specific authority in Articles I
and III to command such advice, the juxtaposition strongly suggests that the Constitution itself never empowers Congress or
35 US Const Art I, § 7, cl 2–3 (providing that “[e]very Bill which shall have passed
the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented
to the President of the United States” and describing the veto power and procedure).
36 US Const Art II, § 3, cl 1 (“He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures
as he shall judge necessary and expedient.”).
37 See George Washington, Letter to the Senate and the House of Representatives
(Jan 8, 1790), in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed, 30 The Writings of George Washington from the
Original Manuscript Sources 1745–1799 494, 494 (GPO 1939) (mentioning that aides
would provide “such papers and estimates” to fulfill the president’s obligation under the
State of the Union Clause).
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the courts to demand the executive’s legal advice. In sum, the
text neither authorizes judicial or congressional demands for legal
advice nor obliges the executive to comply with such demands.
Structure points in the same direction. The Constitution
creates three independent and coequal branches. They are independent in the sense that none is wholly dependent upon the
others. They are coequal in the sense that they have an equal
dignity, with none subordinate to the others. That independence
and equality would be compromised if one branch could force
another to opine on legal matters. By the same token, a generic
duty to opine would tend to subordinate the institution so
obliged. A broad power to demand legal advice from another
branch implies a certain subordinacy in much the same way
that the Opinions Clause suggests a subordinacy between the
president and the department heads. To be sure, complete subordination does not automatically follow from a power to command opinions. But there is a subordinacy insofar as the power
to command advice or a duty to supply it necessarily envisions
one branch as the principal (the commander) and the other as
the agent (the commanded). We believe that the Constitution’s
structure suggests that the courts are not the aides or assistants
of Congress or the president, even as they execute the laws
made by both: the president is not the legal adviser of Congress
or the courts, even as he must execute the laws of the former
and the judgments of the latter, and Congress is certainly not a
legal aid office for the courts or the executive.
The inability of each branch to demand opinions from the
others makes sense because each is fully capable of reaching its
own legal conclusions. Members of Congress have aides, including expert lawyers, who help them discern the meaning of federal and state law. Additionally, members can hear expert testimony from practitioners and professors. Similarly, each
executive department has a general counsel’s office charged with
making sense of the laws committed to it. Should difficult questions arise, executive officials can seek a legal opinion from the
Office of Legal Counsel in the DOJ.38 Finally, the courts have
their accumulated legal wisdom, party and amicus filings, the
oral arguments, and their law clerks. Given the multiple sources
of legal advice from which each branch may draw, none needs
the power to require the legal advice of the others.
38



See 28 CFR § 0.25; 28 USC §§ 509, 510, 515–19.
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What is implicit in text and structure also seems to have
been accepted from the Constitution’s beginning. Long ago, President George Washington sought the advice of the Justices on
legal questions related to the French Treaty of Alliance.39 The
Justices demurred, saying that the “lines of separation drawn by
the Constitution” afforded a “strong argument[ ]” that giving judicial advice would be inappropriate.40 We think the Constitution’s “lines of separation” similarly counsel against reading it as
if it authorized any branch to demand the opinions of the others.
As relevant for our purposes is the manner in which Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson sought the legal advice of the
Justices. Jefferson’s letter declared that Washington would be
“much relieved” if the Justices could answer several legal questions related to the treaty.41 He then “asked” for the attendance
of the Justices to further inquire whether the public could benefit from their opinions.42 We think the letter suggests that neither Washington nor Jefferson believed that the president could
demand the opinions of the justices. After the Justices declined,
the lack of any executive pushback or protest suggests the same.
Washington could do no more than request their advice because
it was obvious that he had no constitutional right to it.
Another episode suggests that Congress did not believe it
could command opinions. During the extraordinarily long debate
that preceded the Decision of 1789,43 it never occurred to members of Congress that they might demand that the holdover secretaries of the executive departments provide their expert opinion on the best way to read the Constitution. Congress never
sought such opinions despite the fact that secretaries regularly
gave opinions to the predecessor Continental Congress. Members
of Congress likely understood that while the secretaries were
their assistants under the old order, they were not so under the
Constitution. More to the point, members perhaps recognized that

39 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to the Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court
of the United States (July 18, 1793), in Paul Leicester Ford, ed, 6 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 351, 351–52 (Knickerbocker 1895) (“Jefferson–Supreme Court Letter”).
40 See Jay-Washington Correspondence at 488–89 (cited in note 33).
41 Jefferson–Supreme Court Letter at 351 (cited in note 39).
42 Id.
43 The Decision of 1789 relates to the statutes passed by the First Congress that
implied that the president had a constitutional power to remove executive officers. For a
discussion of this episode, see generally Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision
of 1789, 91 Cornell L Rev 1021 (2006).
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the Constitution did not empower them to draw upon the legal
wisdom of executive branch officials.44
We are unaware of any early incident suggesting that the
courts are without power to demand the opinions of the executive or Congress. Yet perhaps more instructive is that the courts
apparently never made such demands, despite the utility of such
opinions. The Washington administration housed some of the
finest legal minds of the era, including Alexander Hamilton,
Edmund Randolph, and Thomas Jefferson.45 The courts surely
could have benefitted from their wisdom. The absence of any
such orders makes sense, for it is hard to suppose that as the
Justices were denying that they should respond to Washington’s
request for advice, they simultaneously supposed that they had
Article III power to demand opinions of the President. We believe that during the Federalist era, the courts were not thought
to possess a generic power to treat executive branch officials as
involuntary clerks.46
When we expand our inquiry beyond this early era, we are
unaware of any practice in which the courts demanded to know
what the president or leading members of Congress thought the
law was. Chief Justice John Marshall never issued a rule to
members of Congress seeking legal opinions on when an appointment vests.47 Chief Justice Roger Taney never demanded to
know the opinions of members on whether Dred Scott could be a
citizen and whether he had been freed by virtue of his travels into the Northwest Territory.48 Justice Rufus Peckham never directed the executive or Congress to file a brief about the validity
of New York’s law limiting the work hours of bakers under the

44 The First Congress did pass a statute obliging the Treasury secretary to provide
various materials to Congress. See An Act to Establish the Treasury Department § 2,
ch 12, 1 Stat 65, 65–66 (1789), codified as amended at 31 USC § 301. But these reports
were to concern plans for the collection of revenue and for the support of the public credit. They did not relate to the meaning of the law. It should be noted that some opposed
this reporting requirement on the ground that it violated separation-of-powers principles. They thought that giving an executive officer such a role in legislation smacked too
much of the English ministry. See Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton 281 (Penguin
2004). In any event, this requirement was a statutory imposition, something unnecessary if Congress had a constitutional power to demand opinions of the executive.
45 See R. Gordon Hoxie, The Cabinet in the American Presidency, 1789–1984, 14
Pres Stud Q 209, 211–14 (1984).
46 For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s order to show cause issued to James
Madison in Marbury, see text accompanying notes 58–59.
47 See generally Marbury, 5 US 137.
48 See Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 US (19 How) 393, 403 (1856).
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Fourteenth Amendment.49 If there is evidence from pre-modern
practice of a generic judicial power to demand legal advice from
the political branches, it has remained remarkably hidden.
Lest our point be misunderstood, we add two caveats. First,
our argument does not reach the duty of the executive to share
information with the branches, particularly information under
its control. We believe that information requests directed to the
executive related to documents and testimony are cut from a different cloth than are demands for legal opinions. As noted earlier, the executive must provide information to Congress as part
of its State of the Union obligation.50 The executive likewise has
an obligation to provide evidence to the courts. That is the lesson of United States v Nixon,51 and it is one that goes back to
President Thomas Jefferson’s tangle with Chief Justice Marshall
during the trial of Aaron Burr.52
Such information requests, when fulfilled, help a coordinate
branch make decisions committed to it. Knowledge of certain
facts peculiarly within the purview of the executive is typically
crucial for Congress to decide if new laws are needed, existing
laws ought to be reformed, or the executive has committed an
impeachable offense. Similarly, the executive must sometimes
disclose facts and documents to the courts if the latter are to decide cases.
In contrast to the need for facts that are peculiarly known to
the executive, there simply is no need for the courts or Congress
to access the legal conclusions formed in the executive branch.
Again we admit that the executive’s legal opinions would be useful to the other branches. Yet their bare utility does not authorize the other branches to demand them, particularly in a context
in which each branch has ample means to reach its own legal
conclusions.
Second, our argument against compelled legal opinions does
not deny that each branch may choose to share its legal opinions
with others. There was a time when some thought that one
branch should not share its views about how another branch
49

See Lochner v New York, 198 US 45, 53–56 (1905).
The executive is also obligated to provide information to Congress in conjunction
with legitimate exercises of Congress’s subpoena authority. See note 30. For a discussion
of the ways in which Congress and the executive negotiate over the boundaries of Congress’s subpoena power, see generally Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information
Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal—Do Nothing, 48 Admin L Rev 109 (1996).
51 418 US 683 (1974).
52 United States v Burr, 25 F Cases 30, 30–34 (CC D Va 1807).
50
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ought to exercise its powers.53 The supposed bar likely was based
on the notion that such advice would constitute an intrusion into
the prerogatives of another branch.54 But we think that view is
mistaken, as it raises the wall of separation between the branches
much too high. We believe that each political branch may advise
the other two branches and the public, without limit.55
B.

Demands for Legal Opinions from the Parties

Until this point, our focus has been on the separation of
powers. But another facet of our argument rests on the principles of party autonomy and the limited power of federal courts.
We believe that the parties to a case have the right to decide
which claims and arguments to make. A court’s authority to say
what the law is does not permit the court to compel whatever legal advice might facilitate the exercise of that authority.
We recognize that our argument may strike some as contrary to current practices, and hence counterintuitive. Judges may
seem quasi-sovereign over their (rather limited) territory. Jurists wear ceremonial robes, insist upon decorum and civility,
and command respect. But these trappings hardly suggest that
the judicial power has little or no limits. In particular, the considerable authority that judges wield in their courtrooms by no
means suggests that they may order parties to make unwanted
arguments, any more than it means that judges can force individuals in their courts to file unwanted suits.
We freely admit that when a court is seized of a case, it has
a raft of powers that arise from what it means to be a court. Article III obviously grants some authority over the case proceedings and some authority over the parties themselves. A partial
list would include the power to impose decorum, to control admission to their bar, to punish contempt, to compel disclosure of

53 Washington complained to Jefferson that congressional requests to convey salutations to foreign nations was an invasion of the executive. See Thomas Jefferson, Note
(March 12, 1792), in Franklin B. Sawvel, ed, The Complete ANAS of Thomas Jefferson
68, 68–69 (Round Table 1903).
54 See Jay-Washington Correspondence at 488–89 (cited in note 33).
55 In our view, the branches ought to share their views with each other as a means
of fulfilling their vow to support the Constitution. If one branch can help another arrive
at the correct legal conclusion, then the Constitution is better defended. Moreover, a regime where the branches share their legal views may lead to a more stable understanding of the Constitution. See Neal Devins and Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 Va L Rev 83, 106 (1998).
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evidence and facts, and to dismiss stale suits.56 But this power
does not include the qualitatively different authority to compel
legal advice or arguments. The difference is that while the above
powers are arguably necessary for the court to function and have
long been thought so, the power to demand legal advice is hardly
necessary for proper judicial functioning and, to our knowledge,
has never been thought to be so.
Notwithstanding the modern movements away from the
dispute resolution model and toward the law declaration model
and other innovations in judicial practices,57 the parties retain a
great measure of autonomy. In every case before a court, each
party decides for itself what claims it will bring and which arguments it will make. A plaintiff may decide not to bring a plausible tort claim and to raise a contract claim only. The defendant
may elect, for whatever reason, to omit a potentially successful
defense or not bring a colorable counterclaim. Courts cannot
force parties to articulate arguments, claims, or defenses, even if
they suspect that they are legally valid or case dispositive.
This has long been the case, as far as we know. In Marbury
v Madison,58 Chief Justice Marshall never suggested that James
Madison had violated a constitutional or legal duty by failing to
submit any response to the Court’s rule (the order to show cause
why a mandamus should not issue).59 Though Marshall condemned the failure to issue a commission to William Marbury,
he never faulted Madison for his default. Marshall ought to have
found Madison in contempt if the Secretary of State was legally
obliged to provide an answer to the Court’s order to show
cause.60
In the modern context, when the Supreme Court decides
which legal questions to hear, the parties are free to demur. It is
not uncommon for the Court to grant certiorari in a case where
the party who won below chooses not to litigate any further.61 In
these circumstances the Court has never held such a party in
contempt or more generally claimed a power to direct the respondent to expend funds and argue as the Court would have
56

See Chambers v NASCO, Inc, 501 US 32, 43 (1991).
See notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
58 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
59 Id at 153–54.
60 See Ex parte Hudgings, 249 US 378, 383 (1919).
61 For a sampling of cases in which one or both parties to a dispute refuse to pursue
potentially germane legal issues, see Goldman, Note, 63 Stan L Rev at 918–39 (cited in
note 16).
57
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them litigate. The Court instead asks an amicus to argue the
questions presented.62 This means of satisfying the Court’s appetite for particular arguments suggests that the Court does not
believe that it may simply order the parties to contest legal
questions.63
To be sure, when a court asks a party to pursue a point not
found in their filings, parties typically accept the invitation. A
party may even welcome the invitation, say when it seems likely
to help it prevail. But it is an invitation, not a command. Like all
invitations it may be declined, to the chagrin of the inviter. And
it will be declined if the party believes it gains nothing by doing
what the court desires. Again, sometimes parties before the
highest court in the land decline to address an issue that the
Court believes is relevant. In these cases, the Court never acts
as if the party has violated a duty. What is true for the Supreme
Court is no less true for the inferior courts.
If we step back for a moment and consider the consequences
of a power to demand legal advice of parties, we can see why the
courts have not generally asserted the power. To begin with,
there is the problem associated with the breadth of such a power. If courts could force parties to make legal arguments, a court
could force the plaintiff to amend her complaint and bring ancillary claims the plaintiff would otherwise not wish to bring. The
court might command the plaintiff to bring a contract claim in
addition to the tort claim that was actually part of her complaint. In many cases this would waste resources and act as a
deterrent to the initiation of suits because bringing a suit could
lead the party to incur all sorts of uncertain costs as the court
seized control of the litigation.
Going further, a power to compel legal advice could be used
to force the parties to yield up the weakest points of their own
arguments. “Tell us all the flaws in your briefs and pleadings,” a
court might demand, and the parties would be obliged to comply,
on pain of contempt, with potentially disastrous results for one
side. While courts might ask some variant of this question during oral arguments, counsel often evades the question in some
clever way. If courts can compel such concessions, however, the
evasion would be contemptuous.

62

See id at 918–19.
Alternatively, it may be that the Court does not believe that compelled arguments will be good ones.
63
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At the extreme, a power to demand legal opinions from parties could be used to force both parties to file briefs and motions
advancing the other party’s cause. The plaintiff might be forced
to lodge a filing refuting her complaint. The defendant could be
compelled to file documents suggesting that his legal defense is
without merit. The obligation would extend beyond the filings to
the oral arguments. In a case where one party has an extraordinary oral advocate, a court might greatly benefit from being able
to force that lawyer to argue both sides.
Those who believe that federal courts may force a party to
make arguments must defend all of this. Or, at the very least,
they must articulate and defend a line that permits a court to
order some arguments, claims, and opinions and not others. We
do not believe that this can be done with success.64
Our task is simpler, for our line is cleaner. We do not believe
that the power to decide cases and controversies includes any
power, sweeping or narrow, to force parties to articulate legal
arguments on demand. To find such a power in Article III is to
read too much into it. The commencement of a case does not
grant a court the power to force a party to articulate any legal
claims or arguments, much less the best argument against the
party’s interests.65
What is true for parties seems even truer for nonparties; the
latter cannot be forced to articulate claims, arguments, and
opinions. While courts have the power to compel information
from nonparties, such as witnesses or custodians of evidence,
that is not the same as being able to treat a nonparty as a font of
legal wisdom. A district court cannot dragoon either former Solicitor General Seth Waxman or former Solicitor General Paul
64 One might suppose that courts can force a party to advance only those arguments that are potentially advantageous to that party. This seems simple enough in theory but is fraught with difficulties. A court may wish to hear a particular argument and
issue an order compelling as much. But the party so compelled may already have concluded that a particular argument is wholly meritless and hence not worth advancing. At
this point, the party will be forced to make claims or argue points for no other reason
than to satisfy the court’s legal curiosity. The end result, more likely than not, is that the
court ultimately reaches the same conclusion. This is all a waste of resources, suggesting
that there are sound policy reasons underlying party autonomy. See Larsen, 98 Va L Rev
at 1302–03 (cited in note 16); Frost, 59 Duke L J at 461 (cited in note 15). As compared
to the courts, the parties are generally better positioned to know which arguments best
advance their goals.
65 Courts, of course, are free to raise legal issues they think germane to the legal
dispute and ask the parties to address those issues. If the parties refuse, however, courts
cannot compel such arguments but, instead, may appoint amici to make those arguments. See text accompanying notes 116–19.
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Clement into supplying legal advice, with or without compensation for service rendered, because the federal courts have no
power to require legal service on demand. As important as the
law declaration function is, Article III does not authorize the
conscription of bystanders.
C.

The Possibility of Judicial Reprisals

If we are right that the federal courts lack a constitutional
power to demand legal advice, two things follow. First, those
who ignore a judicial demand for an opinion do no violence to the
Constitution. Ignoring an ultra vires order is perfectly legal. Second, courts cannot punish for failure to comply with such demands. If a court demands an opinion and the executive chooses
not to supply legal advice, the court cannot fine or jail the officers
who rebuff it. Likewise, a judge cannot punish a private party’s
failure to opine as the judge would have it. In sum, those who refuse judicial demands for legal advice are not contemnors.
Can a court do something short of punishing via fine or jail
time? Courts sometimes decide a legal question against a party
when the party fails to address it.66 We are unsure of what to
make of this practice. Although it is common, it is in tension
with the notion that courts should decide cases consistently with
the law. If a plaintiff files a meritless complaint and the defendant elects to ignore the judicial summons issued in response,
perhaps the court ought to consider the merits of the plaintiff’s
complaint before deciding the case and not merely sanction the
defendant for its absence.67 That is what Chief Justice Marshall
did in Marbury. He did not rule that William Marbury had been
appointed simply because James Madison never addressed the
matter.68
In any event, deciding an issue against a party because that
party fails to address it is not the same as punishing that party
for having violated the law. Consider a different context. A
branch often retaliates against another as a means of displaying
its displeasure. The executive may veto legislation to exhibit his
unhappiness stemming from the Senate’s rejection of a treaty.
Congress may curb a court’s jurisdiction to signal its discontent
66

See, for example, Dred Scott, 60 US at 399–404, 429–30.
See Arthur J. Park, Fixing Faults in the Current Default Judgment Framework,
34 Campbell L Rev 155, 155–58 (2011).
68 See generally Marbury, 5 US 137 (omitting discussion of whether Marbury
should receive a commission by reference to Madison’s default).
67
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with the latter’s judicial decisions.69 Such retaliation is not taken
to mean that the victimized branch necessarily has violated a
constitutional duty or that the retaliating branch enjoys a constitutional right that was somehow violated. All it typically
means is that a branch is using a discretionary power to retaliate and thereby conveying its displeasure. So if Congress pares
the White House budget because members do not like the president’s economic agenda, that cut does not imply that the agenda
is somehow illegal or unconstitutional.
Similarly, if the courts can decide an issue or a case against
a party based on that party’s failure to make a legal argument
that the court desires, that power to so rule does not necessarily
imply a constitutional power to compel the production of opinions. It likely means that the court has a limited power to decide
an argument or case without regard to the merits and has chosen to exercise it, probably as a means of expressing its irritation with a party. The power to retaliate against a litigant in
this way does not imply a power to compel the production of legal arguments for the benefit of a court, even as it often has the
in terrorem effect of inducing compliance.
***
Before considering judicial requests for opinions, a summation might prove helpful. The federal courts cannot compel the
executive or Congress to produce legal opinions. Any such power
would make either branch something of a permanent clerk of the
courts, a status inconsistent with their independence and equality. If such an extraordinary power were given to the courts, it
surely would be found in a specific provision and not left to implication. It follows that neither Congress nor the president
must comply with any demand for legal advice the courts might
make. Satisfaction is a matter of prudence or desire to help the
court, not a course of action the Constitution obliges.
More generally, we believe in the principle of party autonomy. The parties rightfully decide which claims to make and
which arguments best further those claims. After all it is their
case. Federal courts lack power to force litigants to articulate legal arguments merely because the courts wish to adjudicate
69 See, for example, Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction to Protect Marriage for the
States, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong, 2d Sess 7–8 (2004), online at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CHRG-108hhrg94458/pdf/CHRG-108hhrg94458.pdf (visited May 13, 2013).
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them. In particular, federal judges cannot compel a litigant to
amend her complaint to include new claims or to file motions
that address issues that the court wishes to consider. Any such
power would suggest that the courts could force one party to articulate arguments for its opponent, something we are sure is
beyond the power of an Article III court.
When the Fifth Circuit demanded a legal opinion announcing the DOJ’s views on judicial review and insisted that the letter address President Obama’s claim about the Affordable Care
Act,70 it lacked authority to compel the production of an opinion.
When the DOJ yielded up the three-page letter in forty-eight
hours, as the Fifth Circuit panel demanded, it acted under no
real legal compunction. Habit, respect, and a desire to curry favor might have compelled the production, but not the Constitution itself.71 Despite the crucial role that judges play in our constitutional system and despite their need to correctly discern
what the law is, the Constitution never places the executive, or
parties to a case more generally, on a retainer for the benefit of
the judiciary.
II. JUDICIAL REQUESTS FOR LEGAL ADVICE FROM NONPARTIES
What then of judicial requests for legal opinions? If the federal courts cannot force the executive, Congress, or members of
the public to supply them with legal advice, perhaps judges can
request that guidance. The separation-of-powers concerns articulated in Part I seem less salient here. In the face of judicial requests, Congress and the executive ostensibly remain independent and need only supply the courts with legal opinions that
serve their institutional interests. Indeed, congressional offices
as well as the DOJ frequently file amicus briefs on their own initiative. So why would it be problematic for federal courts to request legal advice from these branches, or for that matter, the
general public?
Below we explain why judicial requests for legal opinions from
nonparties are generally impermissible.72 Specifically, Article III
70

See text accompanying notes 1–5.
See text accompanying notes 64–65.
72 Our claim in this Part solely concerns judicial requests for advice from nonparties
on questions of federal law. We believe that the federal courts may solicit legal advice and
argumentation from the parties to a case. Such requests can run the gamut from a mere
plea for clarification of existing arguments to an appeal to address wholly new legal concerns that the courts believe might be relevant. As noted in Part I, however, any such
71
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does not authorize federal judges to request the legal opinions of
Congress, the executive, or private interests. Article III does not
replicate the civil law inquisitorial system or empower courts to
act as if they were congressional committees. We agree that federal judges may accord more weight to the filings of the solicitor
general or top Supreme Court advocates—expertise has its advantages.73 Yet such possibilities hardly imply that federal judges have a generic power to request legal advice from nonparties.
We begin by briefly detailing Supreme Court practices governing requests for legal advice to give the reader a sense of the
lay of the land. The Supreme Court routinely calls for the views
of the solicitor general (CVSG), a practice that has transformed
the workload of the solicitor general and the Court’s relations
with the executive branch.74 We also consider whether such requests impermissibly favor the arguments of Court-anointed advocates. Finally, we suggest that, under current practice, nothing prevents the Court or its lower-court counterparts from
actively soliciting legal advice from anyone.
We then turn to our argument. First, we explain why requests for legal advice are anathema to the federal legal system.
Unlike inquisitorial civil law systems or congressional committees, the federal courts generally lack the power to request legal
advice. Second, we discuss the larger debate about whether
courts, especially the Supreme Court, should simply resolve legal issues identified by the litigants or, instead, embrace a law
declaration model in which the judicial role in “saying what the
law is” is paramount. Under the law declaration model (but not
the dispute resolution model), courts can call sua sponte for
briefing on issues they deem relevant to the resolution of a dispute75 and appoint amici to make arguments that a court identifies as salient and which one or both parties are unwilling to

requests for clarification or new argumentation are mere requests and are not constitutionally mandatory. See notes 56–65 and accompanying text. Courts, however, may appoint
amici to advance arguments abandoned by the parties to a dispute. See text accompanying
notes 116–19. See also note 12 (discussing federal court certification of state law issues to
state courts).
73 See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters before and within the Supreme Court:
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 Georgetown L J 1487, 1493–1501
(2008); Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A
Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 Rev Litig 669, 697–98 (2008).
74 See Stefanie A. Lepore, The Development of the Supreme Court Practice of Calling for the Views of the Solicitor General, 35 J S Ct Hist 35, 35, 37–39, 47 (2010).
75 See Monaghan, 112 Colum L Rev at 683, 689–91 (cited in note 15).
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pursue.76 Whichever model (law declaration or dispute resolution) is superior, neither supports a judicial power to request
advice when both parties respond to all issues deemed relevant
by a court.
The only time a federal court may request legal advice from
nonparties is when a party to a case is unwilling to address an
argument that the court deems relevant to a legal dispute
properly before it. In cases where a party refuses to argue a particular point (“orphaned argument”) or refuses to defend the
case entirely (“orphaned case”), the federal courts may appoint
an amicus to argue the point or the case in order to ensure that
the courts receive adversarial arguments on matters properly
before them. Even as we take aim at the federal courts’ general
power to request legal advice from nonparties, we do not take issue with these narrow practices.
The end result is the surprising (but we think correct) conclusion that a current and routine practice, the CVSG, is unconstitutional because the federal courts generally lack the power to
request legal advice of nonparties. Although Congress might be
able to authorize the judiciary to make such requests via its Article I powers,77 Article III’s adversarial system never authorizes
the federal courts to act as if they had the powers of a civil law
inquisitorial court or a congressional investigation committee.
A.

Supreme Court Requests for Legal Advice

For at least sixty years, the Supreme Court has sought legal
advice from the solicitor general of the United States in cases in
which the government is not a party.78 Sometimes the Court calls
for an amicus merits brief from the solicitor general (as it did in
Brown v Board of Education of Topeka79 and other landmark Warren Court rulings80). These requests, however, are quite rare (usually no more than one or two a year).81 More typically (especially in
76

See notes 116–20, 136 and accompanying text.
See notes 101 and 138.
78 See Lepore, 35 J S Ct Hist at 37–39 (cited in note 74). We focus on the Supreme
Court because we are unaware of any statistics compiled about the nature and frequency
of lower court requests for legal advice.
79 347 US 483 (1954) (“Brown I”).
80 See Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth Justice: The Solicitor General and the Rule of
Law 26–32 (Knopf 1987). See also Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 349 US 294
(1955) (“Brown II”).
81 See Timothy R. Johnson, The Supreme Court, the Solicitor General, and the Separation of Powers, 31 Am Polit Rsrch 426, 427 (2003) (noting average of 2.15 requests per
77
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recent years), the Court calls for the views of the solicitor general
on whether it should grant certiorari in a case.82 In about twentythree cases a year, the solicitor general submits a filing in response to a CVSG certiorari request.83
CVSGs significantly impact the Office of the Solicitor General and help define the relationship between the solicitor general and other parts of the executive branch and the Court. To
start, even though CVSGs technically are requests, the solicitor
general “regards participation as mandatory; the office invariably files an amicus brief in response, and then generally continues to participate as an amicus at the merits stage if the Court
grants the case.”84 Executive branch compliance with CVSGs is
so routine and complete that some suggest that the solicitor
general has come to resemble a “judicial officer.”85 Such habitual
year from 1953 to 1986). Over the past five years, we could locate only two such requests.
See Fred Dingledy, Reference Librarian at William & Mary Law School, Email to Neal
Devins, Professor at William & Mary Law School (July 30, 2012) (on file with authors).
In understanding why there are next to no merits-briefs requests today, we suspect that
the Court sees no need to reach out to the solicitor general, for the solicitor general, on
its own initiative, submits merits briefs in most cases. See note 87.
82 See notes 83–88 and accompanying text. See also Ryan C. Black and Ryan J.
Owens, The Solicitor General and the United States Supreme Court: Executive Branch
Influence and Judicial Decisions 49–71 (Cambridge 2012); David C. Thompson and
Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 16 Geo
Mason L Rev 237, 278–87 (2009).
83 See Fred Dingledy, Reference Librarian at William & Mary Law School, Memorandum to Neal Devins, Professor at William & Mary Law School (July 13, 2012) (on file
with authors). CVSG requests have spiked over the past four terms; the number of requests was around fourteen per year from 2000 to 2004. See Thompson and Wachtell, 16
Geo Mason L Rev at 284 (cited in note 82).
84 Margaret Meriwether Cordray and Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s
Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 BC L Rev 1323, 1354 (2010). See also Black
and Owens, Solicitor General at 51 (cited in note 82) (referring to the CVSG as an “order”
and a “command”); Michael J. Bailey and Forrest Maltzman, Inter-branch Communication:
When Does the Court Solicit Executive Branch Views? *3 (unpublished manuscript, Oct 7,
2005), online at http://home.gwu.edu/~forrest/fmcvsg.pdf (visited May 13, 2013). The solicitor general invariably complies because doing so cultivates her relationship with the Court,
thereby enhancing both the status of her office and her ability to advance the president’s
legal policy agenda before the Supreme Court. See Neal Devins and Saikrishna Prakash,
The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 Colum L Rev 507, 537–45 (2012).
85 For Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the solicitor general is a “true friend of the
Court” when responding to CVSG requests; for former Solicitor General Drew Days, the
solicitor general operates not as an advocate but as an “officer of that court” through the
CVSG process. Thompson and Wachtell, 16 Geo Mason L Rev at 270–71 (cited in note
82). For an alternative account of why the Court makes CVSG requests, see Bailey and
Maltzman, Inter-branch Communication at *7–10 (cited in note 84) (arguing that the
justices seek out the views of the executive branch for strategic reasons, including an
assessment of potential executive branch resistance to their decision making).
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compliance with CVSGs constrains the solicitor general’s ability
to advance the president’s agenda before the Court. Indeed,
when one compares the number of cases in which the solicitor
general responds to CVSGs (approximately twenty-three cases
per year) with the number of cases where the solicitor general
seeks certiorari on its own initiative (about sixteen cases per
year),86 it is remarkable how much today’s solicitor general operates at the Court’s beck and call.87 Rather than shaping the
number and types of case through its own certiorari filings, the
modern solicitor general is largely reactive, taking her direction
from the Court. By responding to CVSGs, solicitors general act
as “extra law clerks for the Court,” pitching in “[w]hen times
g[e]t busy” and otherwise.88
While the vast majority of the Supreme Court’s requests for
legal advice are addressed to the solicitor general, the Supreme
Court has sought nonparty advice from Congress, state attorneys general, and private parties. Requests for the advice of the
chambers of Congress date back to at least Myers v United
States,89 where the Court actively sought the advice of the Congress on whether the president had constitutional power to unilaterally remove a postmaster in the face of a statute that required the Senate’s concurrence.90 The practice of seeking the
advice of state officials is “extremely rare” with “only a handful

86 See Cordray and Cordray, 51 BC L Rev at 1348 (cited in note 84). See also Adam
D. Chandler, Comment, The Solicitor General of the United States: Tenth Justice or Zealous Advocate?, 121 Yale L J 725, 728 (2011).
87 Changes in the solicitor general’s practice of filing amicus briefs also call attention to how today’s Office of the Solicitor General operates in the Court’s shadow. Today,
the solicitor general files amicus briefs in most cases in which the government does not
appear as a party. See Cordray and Cordray, 51 BC L Rev at 1353–55 (cited in note 84)
(noting that the solicitor general has participated in more than 75 percent of Supreme
Court cases since 1994 through CVSGs and amicus briefs). By way of comparison, the
solicitor general filed around fifty certiorari petitions per year during the 1980s and filed
amicus briefs in around one-third of cases in which the government was not a party. See
id at 1348–55.
88 Bailey and Maltzman, Inter-branch Communication at *5 (cited in note 84). For a
provocative argument that links the Court’s shrinking docket to the solicitor general’s growing hesitancy to file certiorari petitions, see Cordray and Cordray, 51 BC L Rev at 1366–69
(cited in note 84). See also Chandler, Comment, 121 Yale L J at 729–32 (cited in note 86)
(arguing that the solicitor general is abdicating his responsibility to be an advocate).
89 272 US 52 (1926).
90 See Saikrishna Prakash, The Story of Myers and Its Wayward Successors: Going
Postal on the Removal Power, in Christopher H. Schroeder and Curtis A. Bradley, eds,
Presidential Power Stories 165, 171 (Foundation 2009).
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of examples in the past few decades.”91 The most recent example
was in 2009 when the Court called for the views of the Solicitor
General of Texas on whether it should grant certiorari in a
right-to-counsel case.92 Requests for legal opinions from private
parties typically take place after the Court has granted certiorari and one of the parties to a dispute is unwilling to argue an issue that the Court deems relevant.93 In these cases (usually one
per year), the Court may request that an attorney appear as
amicus to advance the abandoned argument.94
To our knowledge, the Supreme Court has never revealed
the source of its generic power to request opinions. Whatever its
source, the power appears to be without limit. Under current
practice, the Court might request opinions of trade groups (the
Chamber of Commerce), associations dedicated to individual
rights (the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the National Rifle
Association), academic groups (the American Society for Legal
History and the American Law and Economics Association), law
professors (Pamela Karlan, Michael McConnell, and Neal
Katyal), and elite members of the Supreme Court Bar (Maureen
Mahoney and Carter Phillips).95 The Supreme Court might even
91 Amy Howe, More on CVSG-Texas in Rhine v. Deaton, SCOTUSblog (Oct 5, 2009),
online at http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/10/more-on-cvsg-texas-in-rhine-v-deaton (visited May 13, 2013).
92 See Rhine v Deaton, 130 S Ct 357 (2009) (“The Solicitor General of Texas is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the State of Texas.”); Howe, CVSGTexas (cited in note 91). See also Fred Dingledy, Research Librarian at William & Mary
Law School, Memorandum to Neal Devins, Professor at William & Mary Law School
(Aug 1, 2012) (identifying Rhine as the only case in which the Court sought out the views
of a state solicitor general since 2006).
93 Of course, the Court first asks the parties to the dispute to address the relevant
legal claims. For example, in cases where one party has filed a petition for certiorari and
the other party has not responded to that petition, the Court sometimes “request[s] a
response to the petition [from the winner below] . . . and will defer action on the case until the views and arguments of the respondent[s] have been made known.” Eugene
Gressman, et al, Supreme Court Practice 508 (BNA 9th ed 2007). For an empirical study
of so-called Calls for Responses (CFRs), see Thompson and Wachtell, 16 Geo Mason L
Rev at 245–70 (cited in note 82) (documenting that parties treat CFRs as orders). Where
the party fails to respond, the Court may appoint amici to take on the orphaned case. See
Goldman, Note, 63 Stan L Rev at 933–39 (cited in note 16).
94 See Adam Liptak, For Some Orphaned Arguments, Court-Appointed Guardians,
NY Times A16 (Dec 14, 2010). For additional discussion, see notes 61–62, 136.
95 For an example of invited briefs from legal academics, see Brief of Amicus Curiae
by Invitation of the Court, Tapia v United States, No 10-5400, *1 (US filed Mar 10, 2011)
(available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 882592) (Stephanos Bibas, James A. Feldman, Nancy
Bregstein Gordon, and Amy Wax). For examples of invited briefs from elite members of
the Supreme Court Bar, see Brief of the Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of
the Judgment below, Dorsey v United States, Nos 11-5685, 11-5721, *1 (US filed Mar 8,
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find an advisory panel composed of former solicitors general especially helpful in deciding whether to grant certiorari and how
to dispose of cases on the merits, even more so than receiving
advice from the current solicitor general. There is often wisdom
in the views culled from many expert minds.96
Some may find these possibilities troubling because they believe that it is improper either to call for the views of an advocate for only one side of an issue or to elevate particular interest
groups or lawyers. Such judicial requests may undermine the
sense that a case is considered on the merits and not because of
judicial favoritism. Put another way, some may conclude that the
systematic use of favored judicial “counselors” undermines faith
in the rule of law—suggesting that law is not the ultimate touchstone and, instead, the views of the chosen few are controlling.97
Of course the same critique applies with equal force to the
Supreme Court’s current reliance on the solicitor general. Empirical studies and the justices’ own comments make clear that solicitor general filings are read with special care.98 Indeed, when the
justices call for the views of the solicitor general on whether to
grant certiorari, they typically follow her recommendation.99
We do not think that concerns about judicial favoritism,
standing alone, are persuasive. The solicitor general and other
top advocates deserve the deference that comes from a history of
top-notch briefs and oral arguments. Expertise has its rightful
advantages. Still, we are mindful that others would find the
anointing of the Chamber of Commerce in business cases or the
ACLU in First Amendment cases troubling in a constitutional
sense. If that is the case, they should be equally troubled by the
obvious and outsized influence that the solicitor general wields
upon the Court.100
We find current practice problematic because it suggests no
limiting principle, with the courts able to seek out legal advice
2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 765218) (Miguel Estrada); Brief for Amicus Curiae in Support of the Judgment below by Invitation of the Court, Setser v United States,
No 10-7387, *1 (US filed Oct 11, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 4872041)
(Evan A. Young and Aaron Streett).
96 See Iain McLean and Fiona Hewitt, Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice and
Political Theory 34–40 (Elgar 1994).
97 Consider Lazarus, 96 Georgetown L J at 1521–22 (cited in note 73).
98 See note 73. See also Black and Owens, Solicitor General at 70–71 (cited in note 82).
99 See Black and Owens, Solicitor General at 58–70 (cited in note 82); Thompson
and Wachtell, 16 Geo Mason L Rev at 275–77 (cited in note 82).
100 The solicitor general typically advances the policy views of the president and,
more generally, advocates for executive branch power.
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from anyone. We do not think that the judicial power of Article
III extends so far. Equally troubling is that the federal courts
have pointed neither to Article III nor some congressional statute to justify the practice of soliciting argument; instead, they
have simply assumed this sweeping power.101
B.

Judicial Requests for Advice and the Federal Legal System

Despite being a fixture of recent Supreme Court practice,
Article III never authorizes judicial requests for legal advice
from nonparties. The federal legal system, unlike civil law systems, is adversarial, not inquisitorial. And while the boundaries
of what constitutes an adversarial system are subject to debate,102 there is no question that “[p]arties, rather than officers
of the state, control[ ] case preparation.”103 Indeed, “party presentation is cited as the major distinction” between the federal system and the inquisitorial systems of continental Europe.104 More
than that, by separating the prosecutorial and adjudicatory
functions, the adversarial system limits executive branch control
over the judiciary and, in so doing, comports with the constitutional ideal of an independent judiciary performing distinctively
judicial acts.105 Correspondingly, the case or controversy requirement mitigates the risk of the judiciary overstepping its
bounds and performing nonjudicial functions.106 Specifically, by
101 For instance, the landmark Judges Bill of 1925 provided the Supreme Court with
authority to decide which cases to take and, in so doing, transformed the Court from an
institution that had no choice but to exercise judicial power to one in which the Court
decides what legal issues it wants to address. See Judiciary Act of 1925 § 1 (“Judges Bill
of 1925”), Pub L No 68-415, ch 229, 43 Stat 936, 937–38. For an excellent treatment of
the tension between discretionary certiorari power and traditional judicial review, see
Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years after
the Judges’ Bill, 100 Colum L Rev 1643, 1713–30 (2000). We believe that if the federal
courts are to have the power to seek legal advice from nonparties, they must be given
that power by Congress, for the Constitution itself never conveys such power. Yet Congress has never granted such power to the federal courts. There is nothing in the Federal
Rules of Evidence or any congressional law that authorizes federal judges to seek expert
opinions on questions of federal law. For additional discussion, see notes 109–10 and accompanying text (discussing the appointment of expert witnesses).
102 As we discuss in Part II.C, the two competing adjudicatory models utilized by
American courts (dispute resolution and law declaration) both recognize that the American system is adversarial.
103 Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv L Rev 374, 381–82 (1982).
104 Frost, 59 Duke L J at 449 (cited in note 15).
105 See Resnik, 96 Harv L Rev at 381 (cited in note 103) (arguing that the adversarial model’s focus on the parties is consistent with the Framers’ desire to vest significant
judicial power in the public through juries, public trials, and limits on court power).
106 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 1.
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looking to adversarial parties and not state agents to present the
facts and legal arguments, the case or controversy requirement
“limit[s] the business of federal courts to . . . [matters] historically
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process” and,
in so doing, “assure[s] that the federal courts will not intrude into
areas committed to the other branches of government.”107
Without question, Article III’s embrace of the adversarial
model is core to the judicial function “both in how the facts [and
legal arguments] are presented and in which court is responsible
for finding them.”108 Indeed, even when the federal system allows for departures from a purely adversarial system, those departures often highlight the dominance of that model. For example, while federal judges are authorized to appoint expert
witnesses (typically in cases that deal with technical issues of
fact),109 judges rarely do so for fear that such appointments
might “inappropriately deprive the parties of control over the
presentation of the case.”110
In sharp contrast, “civil-law systems give judges the leading
role in deciding which facts need to be ascertained and bringing
them out (thus seeking directly to determine the truth . . . ).”111
Civil law systems use trials that involve “hearings and consultations for the presentation and consideration of evidence.”112
While the focus of the inquisitorial model is judicial fact-finding,
the “active role” of the judge sometimes extends to matters of

107

Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83, 95 (1968).
Gorod, 61 Duke L J at 25 (cited in note 15).
109 See Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special Masters in the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 Minn L Rev 625, 684
(2002) (remarking that the Federal Rule of Evidence 706 power to appoint experts is
rarely invoked). And while there is nothing prohibiting the appointment of expert witnesses to provide information on legal questions, we are unaware of any instance in
which a federal judge appointed an expert witness to provide a legal opinion on the
meaning of federal law. To our knowledge, the only instances in which federal courts
have asked experts to provide information on legal questions involved foreign court interpretations of foreign law (and we are aware of only a few cases in which courtappointed experts provided information on foreign law). See Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening the Door to a Greater
Global Understanding, 46 Wake Forest L Rev 887, 927–30 (2011) (asserting the value of
court-appointed foreign law experts and noting that the practice is used rarely).
110 Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 280 Science 537, 538
(1998). See also Joe S. Cecil and Thomas E. Willging, Court-Appointed Experts: Defining
the Role of Experts Appointed under Federal Rule of Evidence 706 4–5 (Federal Judicial
Center 1993).
111 Rowe, 36 Sw U L Rev at 205 (cited in note 13).
112 Apple and Deyling, A Primer on the Civil-Law System at 37 (cited in note 13).
108
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law.113 In Germany, for example, the federal Constitutional
Court can “call for specialized opinions from third parties and
appoint experts to report on specific legal issues.”114 Against this
backdrop, there is little question that judicial requests for nonparty legal opinions adhere to the inquisitorial model of civil law
countries, not the adversarial model embraced by the federal
system. The power to seek out information on questions of law
and fact is central to the inquisitorial model (which merges executive and judicial functions) and alien to the American model
(which vests substantial power in the hands of the adversaries
specifically to ensure the separation of the executive and judicial
functions).115
Judicial requests for nonparty legal opinions are alien to the
federal courts for a second, related reason. Such requests for legal advice have the look and feel of a legislative, not a judicial,
act. These requests mirror what congressional committees do
through hearings and have little connection to an adversarial
system in which parties and amici submit facts and legal arguments to courts. More to the point, while federal courts adjudicate particular “cases or controversies,” legislatures exercise a
general jurisdiction and can act affirmatively in assessing issues
of facts and law. Given their sweeping authority, legislative
committees are not confined by party pleadings or filings and
can subpoena any and all witnesses who may assist Congress in
sorting out the relevant facts and law.116 By way of contrast (and
reflecting fundamental differences between courts and legislatures under the American system), courts cannot call witnesses,
must adhere to rules against ex parte communications, and
must decide a particular case at a particular moment in time.117
113 John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U Chi L Rev
823, 843 n 71 (1985).
114 Peter L. Murray and Rolf Stürner, German Civil Justice 416 (Carolina Academic
2004).
115 See Resnik, 96 Harv L Rev at 380–82 (cited in note 103).
116 For an overview of the structural differences between courts and legislatures,
including an assessment of whether Congress is better equipped than federal courts to
gather and assess information, see Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the
Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 Duke L J 1169, 1177–87 (2001). See
also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U Chi L Rev 933,
937–63 (2006) (highlighting strengths and weaknesses of legislative and judicial decision
making).
117 For this very reason, judicial minimalists argue that the Supreme Court should
recognize the judiciary’s institutional limits by issuing “narrow” and “shallow” decisions.
See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court
10–14 (Harvard 1999). See also Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and
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And while courts may consult amicus briefs and conduct their
own research (now fueled by the Internet),118 the American system never anticipates that courts will seek legal opinions from
nonparties because Article III never authorizes as much.119
We can think of but one exception, an exception that comports with Article III’s commitment to the adversarial model.120
The power of courts to “say what the law is” includes the power
to ask the parties to a dispute to argue legal issues that the
courts identify as relevant. When one or both parties are unwilling to make such arguments, a court may request amici to file
briefs. In such circumstances, appointment of amici (a request
for legal advice) helps ensure an adversarial presentation of all
legal issues the court deems pertinent. When both sides to a legal dispute are willing to make arguments on all relevant legal
issues, however, a court’s solicitation of legal arguments transcends the bounds of federal judicial power. In these circumstances the court has no need for outsiders to present legal opinions to the court because the parties themselves fulfill that
function. If the power to request opinions in these circumstances
is tied to the perceived need for the court to hear both sides of an
argument, as we believe it is, then there can be no power to request opinions when both sides to a case are ready, willing, and
able to make their own arguments. In other words, when the
parties are adversarial on all relevant points of law, the courts
cannot solicit legal advice from nonparties in order to provide
more or better adversarialness.

Institutions, 101 Mich L Rev 885, 948–50 (2003) (arguing that debates over legal interpretation should be informed by assessments of the judiciary’s institutional capacity).
118 For a critical assessment of the Supreme Court’s use of Google searches, see
Larsen, 98 Va L Rev at 1295–301 (cited in note 16). For a critical assessment of the Supreme Court’s use of amicus briefs, see Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman
Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal, 89 Tex L Rev 1247, 1267–70 (2011).
119 In making this claim, we recognize that judicial adjuncts—most notably special
masters—sometimes call nonparty witnesses in their fact-finding efforts. See Carstens,
86 Minn L Rev at 653–54 (cited in note 109); James S. DeGraw, Rule 53, Inherent Powers, and Institutional Reform: The Lack of Limits on Special Masters, 66 NYU L Rev 800,
820–28 (1991). Whether this practice is fundamentally at odds with the adversarial process, we are unaware of any instance in which a special master requested legal opinions
from nonparty witnesses.
120 See notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
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Law Declaration, Dispute Resolution, and Requests for
Advice

By generally leaving it to parties and not the state to frame
legal disputes, the adversarial model insulates the courts from
other parts of the government.121 At the same time, party control
sometimes constrains the judiciary’s ability to “say what the law
is.” Parties may fail to raise issues germane to the resolution of
disputes and may be unwilling to pursue some legal arguments
that would support their side of the case.122 For some scholars
(and increasingly the Supreme Court), the judiciary’s responsibility to “say what the law is” sometimes trumps party control of
the dispute. Others reject the law declaration model, urging the
courts to adhere to the “formally dominant” dispute resolution
model.123
We take no side in this dispute. Requests for legal advice
have no place in either the law declaration or dispute resolution
model when both parties to a legal dispute stand willing to argue all relevant legal issues (including those issues raised by the
presiding court). Again, there may be a place for court-appointed
amici when either party abandons or fails to pursue relevant legal arguments. But our analysis suggests that the Court should
not otherwise solicit the views of nonparties, including the solicitor general, Congress, or members of the Supreme Court Bar.124
Under the dispute resolution model, courts exist to “settle
disputes” between parties and, consequently, should look solely
to the law and facts submitted by the parties.125 Correspondingly, “[i]f the parties agree on a proposition, that proposition simply is not in dispute” and a court should neither raise issues sua
sponte nor enlist amici to make legal arguments that one or the
other party is unwilling to make.126 Needless to say, under this
model courts cannot order or solicit nonparty legal opinions.
121

See text accompanying notes 105–07.
See Frost, 59 Duke L J at 467–69 (cited in note 15); Goldman, Note, 63 Stan L
Rev at 939–50 (cited in note 16); Neal Devins, Asking the Right Questions: How the
Courts Honored the Separation of Powers by Reconsidering Miranda, 149 U Pa L Rev
251, 258–69 (2000).
123 Monaghan, 112 Colum L Rev at 668–69 (cited in note 15) (explaining that, while
the dispute resolution model is “formally dominant,” the Supreme Court increasingly
adheres to the law declaration model). For leading articles defending these two models,
see note 15.
124 See notes 78–88 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s practice
of CVSG in around two dozen cases per year).
125 Lawson, 109 Mich L Rev at 1218 (cited in note 15).
126 Id at 1219.
122
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The law declaration model emphasizes that adjudication is
about “articulating public norms as well as settling private disputes”127 and, relatedly, that “judges serve a dual role: they must
resolve the concrete disputes before them, and . . . are also expected to make accurate statements about the meaning of the
law that govern beyond the parameters of the parties and their
dispute.”128 Litigants therefore do not control the record; judges
can turn to amicus briefs and do independent research to supplement litigant filings.129 Litigants, moreover, cannot dictate
what issues or interpretive methodologies courts will use. For
example, it is for the courts, not the litigants, to determine
whether a court should invoke the avoidance canon.130 Likewise,
litigants cannot disregard a potentially controlling statute and
compel a constitutional ruling when a case might be resolved on
statutory grounds.131 Furthermore, if the Supreme Court wants
to revisit the continuing validity of its free speech, federalism, or
choice of law doctrine, litigants cannot stop the Court.132 In all
these ways, the law declaration model speaks to the power of
courts, especially the Supreme Court, to have both “the final say
on any constitutional issue appropriate for judicial resolution”
and “maximum freedom in agenda setting, quite irrespective of
the litigants’ wishes.”133

127 Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy
between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 BU L Rev 1273,
1275 (1995).
128 Frost, 59 Duke L J at 452 (cited in note 15).
129 See Gorod, 61 Duke L J at 25–37 (cited in note 15) (discussing extra-record fact
finding and a potential tension between the Supreme Court’s use of amicus briefs and
the adversarial model); Larsen, 98 Va L Rev at 1257–58 (cited in note 16) (discussing the
modern Court’s use of internet searches to supplement party and amicus briefs).
130 See Monaghan, 112 Colum L Rev at 719 (cited in note 15), citing Frost, 59 Duke
L J at 510 (cited in note 15).
131 See Frost, 59 Duke L J at 509–11 (cited in note 15); Devins, 149 U Pa L Rev at
279–84 (cited in note 122).
132 See Devins, 149 U Pa L Rev at 261–62 (cited in note 122) (discussing the Court’s
reconsideration of the federal common law doctrine in Erie notwithstanding party efforts
to preserve the then-existing doctrine of Swift v Tyson), citing Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938) and Swift v Tyson, 41 US (16 Pet) 1 (1842). Other instances in
which the Court called for supplemental briefing to consider overruling existing doctrine
include Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528, 536, 546–47
(1985) (holding that states cannot claim immunity from federal regulations based on
“traditional” governmental functions), and Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 130 S Ct 876, 893 (2010) (ruling against the federal government with respect to political freedom of speech for corporations).
133 Monaghan, 112 Colum L Rev at 722 (cited in note 15).
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Yet even as the law declaration model limits litigant control
in framing and presenting cases, it does not disavow or upend
the “American adversarial legal system,” including the central
idea that—unlike the inquisitorial model—“parties [typically]
present the facts and legal arguments to an impartial and passive decisionmaker.”134 “Allowing judges to raise issues is not
equivalent to transforming the judge into an advocate for one
side or the other,” for both parties are given an opportunity to
address the issues.135 And if one of the parties is unwilling to
pursue a court-identified issue, the court may appoint an amicus
to ensure an adversarial presentation of all issues deemed relevant by the court.136 In other words, the law declaration model
limits party control in ways that facilitate adversarial presentations of all legal issues deemed relevant by a court. Consequently, as we noted earlier, when both parties to a dispute stand
ready to address all legal issues identified by a court, the law
declaration model does not suggest that the courts may order or
request supplemental legal filings.137
Put another way, while it is possible that particular adherents of the law declaration model may believe that the federal
courts should have the power to request legal opinions from
nonparties, any such belief does not follow from the principles
that underlie the law declaration model. After all, the law declaration model does not suppose that the courts must have any
and all resources that facilitate judicial declaration of what the
law is. For example, we do not know of any adherents of the law
declaration model who believe that courts have a constitutional
right to law clerks or a limited docket, both of which would be
extremely useful in correctly declaring the law. Nor do we believe that proponents of the law declaration model think that the
courts can offer bounties to induce the filing of lawsuits that
then enable courts to expound on the meaning of the law. The
law declaration model does not countenance an unyielding and
uncompromising commitment to whatever would conduce judicial interpretations.
134

Frost, 59 Duke L J at 449 (cited in note 15).
Id at 501.
136 See id. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Goldman, Note, 63 Stan L Rev at
939–50 (cited in note 16) (considering the circumstances where court appointment of
amicus is consistent with the underlying goals of the adversarial system).
137 In making this point, we express no opinion on whether the law declaration model extends to CVSGs and the decision to grant certiorari or, instead, is limited to those
cases that the Court will decide.
135
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CONCLUSION
We think it clear that the federal courts lack constitutional
authority to demand legal opinions from others, governmental
actors or otherwise. The Constitution generally spells out when
one branch owes a duty to supply advice to others. Yet there is
no power granted to federal judges to demand opinions of other
branches. Relatedly, neither of the political branches has any
constitutional duty to comply with any demands for legal opinions that the federal courts might make. More generally, the
federal judicial power is a power to decide cases. While that
power includes authority over court proceedings—to compel the
production of evidence and to control admission to practice—it
does not encompass the different power to compel the production
of legal advice. Indeed, we believe that the federal courts even
lack the power to compel the parties to a case to supply legal advice. The parties are free to ignore judicial demands for legal
argumentation.
We also believe that federal courts generally may not request legal advice from nonparties. Federal courts are neither
congressional committees nor civil law inquisitorial tribunals,
both of which have free reign to seek legal advice. The only time
that federal courts may request legal advice is when one or both
parties to a dispute refuse to supply legal arguments regarding
an issue the court deems relevant. Under these circumstances,
the law declaration model suggests that the courts may request
the legal advice of third parties. In no other circumstances do either the law declaration or dispute resolution models suggest
that the courts have power to request legal advice.
Our critique of federal judicial requests for legal advice
means that CVSGs are beyond the scope of the judicial power
conveyed by Article III. Put another way, unless and until Congress authorizes such requests, CVSGs are unconstitutional.138
While CVSGs are a staple of recent practice, no one, not even the
Supreme Court, has ever explained the source of the authority to
request the legal opinions of nonparties. We are confident that
when one begins that much belated inquiry, one will conclude

138 For identical reasons, the Supreme Court could not claim inherent power to control its docket through grants of certiorari. That power came through the Judges Bill of
1925. See note 101.
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that the federal courts lack the power to seek legal advice from
any and all.139
At a minimum, judicial orders and requests for legal advice
require justification of the sort that the courts have never offered.140 Rather than assume a general, roving power to demand
or request nonparty legal opinions, federal courts should justify
such demands and requests by reference to Article III or some
statute. Instead, courts, especially the Supreme Court, assume
that they can give “homework assignments” to the DOJ and others. This judicial hubris stems from the Supreme Court’s eagerness to declare legal principles rather than merely to resolve
disputes. Our Essay will be a success if it spurs courts and
scholars to examine and justify this unexplored feature of federal court (especially Supreme Court) practice.

139 We speak here of legal advice on questions of federal law. As noted earlier, the
issue of federal court certification of state law issues to state courts is beyond the scope
of this Essay. See note 12.
140 See Monaghan, 112 Colum L Rev at 680–83 (cited in note 15) (noting the failure
of courts to formally articulate a theory defending its increasing embrace of the law declaration model).

